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Abstract
While there is a large empirical literature on the intergenerational
transmission of health and survival outcomes in relation to lifestyles, little
theoretical work exists on the long-run prevalence of (un)healthy lifestyles
induced by mortality patterns. To examine that issue, this paper devel-
ops an overlapping generations model where a healthy lifestyle and an
unhealthy lifestyle are transmitted vertically or obliquely across gener-
ations. It is shown that there must exist a locally stable heterogeneous
equilibrium involving a majority of healthy agents, as a result of the larger
parental gains from socialization e¤orts under a higher life expectancy. We
also examine the robustness of our results to the introduction of parental
altruistic concerns for childrens health and of asymmetric socialization
costs.
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1 Introduction
Recent empirical studies support the existence of an intergenerational transmis-
sion of health and survival outcomes. In his survey, Ahlburg (1998) underlines
the large correlation between parentshealth and childrens health.1 As shown
by the study of Yashin and Iachine (1997) surveyed in Ahlburg, there is a cor-
relation of about 0.15 to 0.30 between the lifespans of parents and the ones
of their children. More recently, Case et al. (2002) nd, on the basis of U.S.
data, large e¤ects of parental health on childrens health: if a child aged 0-3
has a mother in a very good or excellent health, the chances for that child of
being also in a very good or excellent health are 27 % larger ceteris paribus.
Finally, Coneus and Spieb (2008) conrm the existence of an intergenerational
transmission of health in early childhood. Other recent studies show also the
familial transmission of characteristics directly related to health outcomes.2
The high correlation between parental health and childrens health (or sur-
vival) reects both the genetic component of health and longevity, and, also,
the familial environment in which children live, which is common to parents
and children. Note that it is not trivial to identify the contributions of genetic
and environmental determinants of health and survival.3 Regarding longevity
determinants, most studies addressing that issue focused on the correlation of
lifespans between identical twins (i.e. monozygotic) and fraternal twins (i.e.
dizygotic). Yashin and Iachine (1997) point to larger lifespan correlations for
identical twins than for fraternal twins (0.3 against 0.2), which highlights the
crucial role of genetic background as a factor explaining longevity.4 However,
even if the genetic component of the intergenerational transmission of health is
signicant, genes alone cannot su¢ ce to explain longevity outcomes as a whole:
as stated by Christensen et al. (2006), the genetic background of individuals
accounts for only one quarter to one third of intracohort longevity inequalities.
Thus, the social environment, and in particular the familial environment, remain
important determinants of the intergenerational correlation of longevity.
How can one explain the contribution of the familial environment to the
intergenerational correlation of health and survival? One obvious channel con-
cerns the interfamily transmission of lifestyles, which, as this is well-known
among demographers, play a signicant role in the determination of health and
longevity.5 Lifestyles, dened as general ways of living, consist of various dimen-
sions a¤ecting survival prospects, including, among others, eating behaviour,
alcoholism, smoking, and physical activity.6 To give a concrete idea of the size
of the impact of lifestyles on mortality, we can refer to the longitudinal study
1Ahlburg regards this intergenerational correlation of health as a major determinant, jointly
with the correlation of familial education levels, of intergenerational correlations of income.
2See Currie and Moretti (2005) on the intergenerational transmission of birth weight, and
Kebede (2003) on the transmission of height.
3Actually, as shown by Christensen et al. (2006), the identication of the genetic and non-
genetic determinants of longevity is a real challenge, since this presupposes the absence of
unobserved heterogeneity. However, many genetic and non-genetic longevity factors are not
reported in the data, simply because these are not yet known to be important.
4Those results are conrmed by Herskind et al.s (1996) study of Danish twins.
5However, it should be stressed that lifestyles are not the only determinants of longevity:
there are also genetic factors (Christensen et al. 2006), and environmental ones (Kinney and
Oskanyak 1991), both of these being not related at all with lifestyles.
6On those various behavioural determinants of longevity, see Doll and Hill (1950), Kaplan
et al. (1987), Peto et al. (1992), Solomon and Manson (1997), and Bender et al. (1998).
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carried out by Kaplan et al. (1987) in California. That study highlighted that
individuals above age 60 who were smoking in 1965 faced, during the next 17
years, an overall mortality risk that is 1.40 times the mortality risk of those who
never smoked. A mortality risk di¤erential of 1.38 was estimated for agents who
have little leisure-time physical activity in 1965. Moreover, alcoholic consump-
tion and overweight are shown to an overmortality of about 1.20. That strong
inuence of lifestyles on health and survival outcomes is also conrmed by re-
cent microeconometric studies taking unobserved heterogeneity into account,
including Contoyannis and Jones (2004) and Balia and Jones (2008).
Given the large intergenerational correlations in health and the crucial role
played by lifestyles, it does not come as a surprise that empirical evidence con-
rms the existence of a transmission of unhealthy lifestyles. If we take, for
instance, the case of smoking, Jones (1994) showed that parental smoking in-
creases the probability of becoming a smoker, and reduces the age of starting.
This supports the idea that the family a¤ects lifestyle choices. Moreover, Goode
et al. (2008) show that, among low income households, there is a statistically
signicant intergenerational transmission of unhealthy eating habits.
Note, however, that many factors a¤ect the adherence to a more or less
healthy lifestyle, and the familial environment is not the unique one. Regarding
cigarettes consumption, the membership to a high socioeconomic group and the
education level tend, according to Jones (1994), to reduce the probability to start
smoking and the duration of smoking.7 Moreover, Hersch (2000) highlighted
that the demand for cigarettes is decreasing in the education level (especially
for high income persons), and depends on the employment status and on the
presence of children.8 Having stressed that point, it remains that the family
plays a signicant role in the transmission of (un)healthy lifestyles to children,
and, hence, in the transmission of health and survival outcomes.
All in all, the large empirical evidence supporting a strong intergenera-
tional transmission of lifestyles, if taken jointly with the signicant inuence
of lifestyles on longevity, allows us to explain, at least in part, the stylized facts
we started from: the observed correlation between parental health and chil-
drens health (and survival). However, those empirical studies do not bring us
an answer to a particular question, which concerns the evolution of lifestyles
and mortality in the long-run. True, lifestyles a¤ect mortality, but it is also
the case that mortality inuences lifestyles, in the sense that ways of life are
the outcome of a natural selection process induced by mortality. Hence, while a
change in mortality must follow from a change in lifestyles, the opposite is also
true: a change in mortality is also a¤ecting the prevailing lifestyles. In the light
of that two-directional relationship, a natural question arises: what will be the
long-run equilibrium prevalence of unhealthy lifestyles? For instance, does the
mere fact that smoking reduces longevity imply that smoking will disappear in
the long-run? Under which conditions will unhealthy lifestyles survive?
An answer to that question requires a theoretical study of the transmission
of healthy (and unhealthy) lifestyles across generations. The pioneer models
of intergenerational transmission of cultural traits and lifestyles are the ones
developed by Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001). In those frameworks, cultural
7The impact of the socio-economic status on smoking is conrmed by Chen et al. (2007).
8Among other factors, the nancial conditions in which agents are seem to be related with
their unhealthy lifestyles. As shown by Grafova (2007), there is a correlation between holding
a non-collateralized debt (NCD) and smoking.
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traits (e.g. preference parameters) can be transmitted vertically (from parents to
children) or obliquely (from a role model to children), and parents can, through
socialization e¤orts, raise the probability that their children will acquire their
cultural trait. Note, however, that, while a large theoretical literature exists
on the transmission of traits across generations, there has been little work so
far on the specic transmission of (un)healthy lifestyles. Actually, following the
pioneer contribution of Bisin and Verdier, models of cultural transmissions were
applied to various issues, such as religions and marriage (Bisin et al. 2004),
globalization and trade (Olivier et al. 2008), work organizations (Hiller 2010),
unemployment (Michau 2009), and the fertility transition (Baudin 2010).
As far as we know, the unique attempt to modelize the e¤ect of lifestyles
transmissions on mortality is the paper by Ponthiere (2010), which consists
of a three-period overlapping generations (OLG) model with a socialization
process following Bisin and Verdier (2001), and where the length of life depends
on the lifestyle adopted by agents when being young adults. However, that
paper focused on only one aspect of lifestyle, the labour supply, and was mainly
concerned with the question of the optimal taxation of labour income in a society
of agents who internalize the consequences of overwork imperfectly. As such, it
could only provide a partial analysis of the dynamics of lifestyles and longevity
in a heterogeneous society, as well as of the role played by families in that
process.
The goal of this paper is to re-examine the intergenerational transmission
of healthy lifestyles, by generalizing the previous paper by Ponthiere (2010), in
such a way as to better identify the role played by the family in the dynamics
of health and longevity outcomes. For that purpose, we develop a three-period
OLG model where agents face a probability of survival to the old age, which
depends on the lifestyle adopted during childhood. For simplicity, the lifestyle
coincides here either with a healthy lifestyle, yielding a higher survival probabil-
ity to the old age, or an unhealthy lifestyle, leading to a lower life expectancy.
In comparison with Ponthiere (2010), which relies on continuous longevity func-
tions, this discrete longevity model is simpler, and allows us to focus more on
the role of the family in the socialization process. To do this, two extensions
of the model are proposed. First, whereas parents want, in Ponthiere (2010),
their children to have the same way of life as themselves, the present model
will, in addition, introduce parental altruism, to account for the fact that par-
ents may care also about the health prospects of their children, and may adjust
their socialization e¤orts accordingly. Second, we expand also Ponthiere (2010)
by introducing asymmetric socialization costs, to account for the fact that it
may be more painful, for parents, to transmit a healthy lifestyle rather than
an unhealthy one. As we shall see, parental altruism and asymmetric social-
ization costs a¤ect the long-run dynamics of heterogeneity signicantly, and, in
particular, the issue of the long-run persistence of unhealthy lifestyles.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. The
long-run dynamics of lifestyles transmission is studied in Section 3. Parental
altruism is introduced in Section 4. Section 5 examines the impact of asymmetric
socialization costs across families. Section 6 concludes.
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2 The basic model
2.1 Environment
Let us consider a three-period overlapping generations model. Each cohort is a
continuum of agents whose size is constant over time, and normalized to unity.
Life is divided in three periods, whose length is normalized to unity. During
period 1 (childhood), agents are all identical, and do not belong to any group.
Children do not make any decision, but are subject to the socialization process,
which will a¤ect their type during the rest of their life.
During period 2 (young adulthood), the population becomes divided in two
groups of agents. Those two groups di¤er in a single aspect: the more or less
healthy lifestyle to which they adhere. The population will thus be divided in
two groups: on the one hand, the healthy population (i.e. type H); on the other
hand, the unhealthy population (i.e. type U). Moreover, the variable qt will
denote the proportion of type H in the cohort who is adult at time t. Each
young adult makes one child, and invests in the socialization of his child.
Finally, not all agents will reach the old age. Only a fraction i of the
population of type i 2 fH;Ug will reach the old age. Following the large
empirical evidence on the e¤ects of lifestyles on longevity, we have
H > U (1)
Group-specic life expectancy at birth is 2+i, for i 2 fH;Ug. Life expectancy
for the whole cohort is qt
 
2 + H

+ (1  qt)(2 + U ) = 2 + qtH + (1  qt)U .
2.2 Socialization
The population follows an adaptation and imitation process of the type modelled
by Bisin and Verdier (2001). The transmission of the cultural trait i 2 fH;Ug,
which consists here of the parameter i reecting the healthy or unhealthy
lifestyle, is modelled as a mechanism where socialization inside the family and
socialization outside the family interact. The rst type of socialization is called
the vertical transmission (from parents to children), whereas the second type
is called the oblique transmission (from a "role model" in the society to the
child).9
Families are composed of one parent and one child. Children are born at
time t without any cultural trait i 2 fH;Ug. Direct vertical socialization to the
parents trait i 2 fH;Ug occurs with a probability it+1. If the direct vertical
socialization does not take place, which happens with a probability 1   it+1,
the child then picks up the trait of a model chosen randomly in the population
of reference, which is the population of young adults. Thus, the child will take
the trait H with a probability qt, and the trait U with a probability 1  qt.
9At this stage, it should be noted that it is extremely di¢ cult to provide clear empirical
evidence supporting one type of socialization process or another: only intergenerational cor-
relations can be observed (see Section 1), and these may hide various, complex mechanisms,
which are more or less voluntary. The Bisin-Verdier modelling captures some important as-
pects of the socialization process, but could hardly account for all of them. That model allows
for some form of voluntary socialization, through the choice of socialization e¤orts by parents,
but, at the same time, there can also be an oblique socialization via a role model, which is,
by nature, not voluntary (since the role model does nothing to be imitated).
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Hence, if pHHt+1 and p
HU
t+1 (resp. p
UU
t+1 and p
UH
t+1) denote the probabilities that
a child born at t in a family with trait H (resp. U) is socialized to, respectively,
trait H and trait U (resp. U and H), the transition probabilities are:
pHHt+1 = 
H
t+1 +
 
1  Ht+1

qt p
HU
t+1 =
 
1  Ht+1

(1  qt)
pUUt+1 = 
U
t+1 +
 
1  Ut+1

(1  qt) pUHt+1 =
 
1  Ut+1

(qt)
(2)
By the Law of Large Numbers, pijt+1 is also equal to the proportion of children
whose parents are of type i who have the cultural trait j. Hence, the proportion
qt+1 of agents born at time t who become of type H follows the dynamic law:
qt+1 =

Ht+1 +
 
1  Ht+1

qt

qt +
 
1  Ut+1

qt

(1  qt) (3)
The rst term is the probability to be socialized to trait H when having a family
of type H, multiplied by the probability to belong to a family of type H. The
second term is the probability to acquire trait H when being born in a family
of type U , multiplied by the probability to belong to a family of type U .
Following Bisin and Verdier (2001), we assume that parents of type i 2
fH;Ug can socialize their children born at time t vertically, by educating them
through a (purely physical) socialization e¤ort eit (0  eit  1). The socialization
e¤ort eit is an input in the cultural production of their children as adults: 
i
t+1 =
(eit): A welfare loss C(e
i
t) is generated by a socialization e¤ort e
i
t. For simplicity,
the disutility from socialization e¤orts takes a quadratic form:
C(eit) = 
 
eit
2
2
(4)
where  accounts for the disutility of socialization e¤orts ( > 0).
Parents have a welfare gain from coexisting with children with the same type
as themselves. The welfare derived by a parent of type i born at t  1 when he
coexists with a child of type i, denoted by 'iit+1, exceeds the welfare derived by
a parent of type i when he coexists with a child of type j 6= i, denoted 'ijt+1.
Welfare gains from having children of ones own type are independent from ones
type and from time: 'HHt+1 = '
UU
t+1 = '^ and '
HU
t+1 = '
UH
t+1 = ~', with '^ > ~'.
Parents, when choosing eit, weight the cost of socialization - C(e
i
t) - against its
expected gains, which depend on the inuence of their e¤ort eit on probabilities
piit+1 and p
ij
t+1, determined by the relation 
i
t+1 = (e
i
t). Note that, even if
parents may look here quite selsh, as they socialize their child in such a way
as to make these like them, whatever the e¤ects it has on the future health of
their children, parents believe that their lifestyle is the best, and just want their
children to benet from the same, "best", lifestyle. Thus parents, even though
they do not necessarily choose what is the best for their children, choose the
best for their children from their own perspective.10
While there exist various ways to model the relation it+1 = (e
i
t), we will
assume that the probability of direct vertical socialization to trait i it+1 equals
parents socialization e¤ort eit, in conformity with what Bisin and Verdier (2001)
call the "Its the family" transmission technology:
it+1 = e
i
t (5)
10Thus, one should be cautious before rejecting the idea that unhealthy parents invest in
the promotion of the unhealthy lifestyle. For type-U parents, the unhealthy lifestyle is, above
all, their lifestyle, i.e. the one they adopted themselves.
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That technology has the virtue of analytical tractability. However, simplicity
has also its drawbacks: a major limitation of that transmission technology is
that it makes the probability of direct vertical socialization to the parents trait
independent from the level of qt. That property is a strong simplication, as it
may be the case that even the e¢ ciency of parental socialization e¤orts depend
on the current composition of the population (see Bisin and Verdier 2001).
However, and for the sake of simplicity, we shall keep that simple technology
here, and leave the exploration of alternative technologies for future research.11
2.3 Agentss decision
For simplicity, agents have preferences that can be represented by a function
that has the expected utility form, and is additive over time. The expected
lifetime utility of an agent of type i is:12
U i =  
 
ei
2
2
+ i
h
piit+1'^+ p
ij
t+1~'
i
(6)
where  is a time preference factor. Socialization e¤orts are made at young
adulthood, whereas the gains from coexisting with a child of ones type occur
at old adulthood. This is why welfare gains from coexisting with ones child are
weighted by the factor  and by the type-specic survival probability i.
Assuming an interior solution, the optimal socialization e¤ort is given by:
eit =
i(1  qi) ('^  ~')

(7)
where qi is the proportion of agents of type i.13 Note that the model exhibits
here what Bisin and Verdier (2001) call the "cultural substitution" property:
a higher proportion of agents of type i in the population of reference makes
parents of type i choose a lower socialization e¤ort. Thus, parents who belong
to a larger group tend to rely more on the society for the socialization of their
children, and thus make fewer socialization e¤orts ceteris paribus. Hence there is
a "substitution" at work here: parents use socialization by means of the society
instead of socialization by means of private e¤orts (the former being cheaper,
and, given the level of qi, su¢ ciently e¤ective).14
Note also that the optimal socialization e¤ort level depends positively on
the life expectancy i. The total welfare gain from coexisting with a child is
determined by the lifetime horizon, so that a higher life expectancy yields a
higher socialization e¤ort. As a consequence of that "lifetime horizon e¤ect",
type-H agents, who have higher longevity prospects, tend also to invest more in
11 It should be stressed, however, that this transmission technology is far from neutral for
the long-run dynamics of lifestyles transmission. See Bisin and Verdier (2001) on the study
of various transmission technologies.
12Agents are here good at anticipating their life expectancy, in conformity with Hamermesh
(1985).
13To have 0 < eit  1, we impose: 
i('^ ~')

 1:
14Note that this property follows from the particular transmission technology (and cost
functions) assumed, but would not necessarily prevail under other technologies (see Bisin
and Verdier 2001). The cultural substitution property is also far from neutral for long-run
dynamics of cultural transmission. Under transmission technologies allowing for cultural com-
plementarity, there could exist stable equilibria without heterogeneity, unlike here.
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socialization than type-U agents. Hence the healthy lifestyle has some form of
evolutionary advantage, in the sense that the agents who adopt it tend, ceteris
paribus, to invest more in the socialization of their own children, which leads to
a higher proportion of that type of agents in the long-run population.
3 Long-run dynamics
In the economy under study, the partition of the population qt determines all
other variables: socialization e¤orts and longevity outcomes. Hence, the con-
stancy of qt over time brings the constancy of all other variables.
Therefore, examining the existence of a stationary equilibrium (i.e. an equi-
librium with constant population composition) amounts to studying whether
there exist some values of qt that can be maintained constant over time. Sub-
stituting for Ht+1 = e
H
t and 
U
t+1 = e
U
t in the expression
qt+1 =

Ht+1 +
 
1  Ht+1

qt

qt +
 
1  Ut+1

qt

(1  qt)
yields the following transition function qt+1  G(qt):
qt+1  G(qt) = qt +  ('^  ~')


Hqt(1  qt)2   Uq2t (1  qt)

Thus, looking for a stationary equilibrium amounts to nd a xed point
for G(qt), that is, a level of qt such that G(qt) = qt. As it is shown in the
Appendix, there exist three stationary equilibria in the economy under study.
Two equilibria involve a perfect homogeneity of the population, whereas one
equilibrium involves some heterogeneity. Proposition 1 summarizes our results.
Proposition 1 There exist three stationary equilibria:
q1 = 0; q2 =
H
H + U
>
1
2
; q3 = 1
Only q2 is locally stable, whereas q1 and q3 are unstable.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Thus, there exist three stationary equilibria: one in which no one has a
healthy lifestyle, as there exist only agents of type U (i.e. q = 0); one in which
everyone follows a healthy lifestyle, as there exist only agents of type H (i.e.
q = 1). Finally, there is also an equilibrium with a mixed population. Note that
the level of that equilibrium depends only on the longevity di¤erential between
agents of types H and U . Given that the healthy agents have a higher life
expectancy (i.e. H > U ), the intermediate equilibrium involves necessarily
a majority of healthy people. Thus, under 0 < q0 < 1, the model predicts
that the long-run population must involve a majority of healthy people, on
the grounds that a healthy lifestyle, by leading to better survival prospects,
implies also a higher socialization e¤ort ceteris paribus, which explains why
the healthy lifestyle nally dominates the unhealthy lifestyle at the stationary
equilibrium. Hence, in this basic model, the healthy lifestyle H exhibits an
evolutionary advantage, and this has nothing to do with parental benevolence:
on the contrary, the evolutionary advantage of the healthy lifestyle is uniquely
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due to the di¤erence in life expectancy between the two lifestyles, which a¤ects
how much egoistic parents invest in the socialization of their children.
Whereas a formal proof of Proposition 1 is provided in the Appendix, we can
here give some graphical intuition behind that result. For that purpose, Figure
1 represents the transition function G(qt) in the (qt; qt+1) space.15 Clearly, the
transition function goes through 0 and 1, as a perfectly homogeneous society
can only reproduce itself over time in the present framework. Moreover, the
transition function is above the 45 line in the neighbourhood of 0, and below
the 45 line around 1. As a consequence, G(qt) must necessarily intersect the
45 line somewhere for 0 < qt < 1. From the argument discussed above we
know also that this intermediate equilibrium must involve a majority of healthy
agents.
q t
Figure 1: Multiplicity of equilibria
Regarding the stability of equilibria, there is, here again, a formal discussion
in the Appendix. However, we can use Figure 1 to give some geometrical intu-
itions. The two extreme equilibria are unstable, as the transition function has
a slope higher than unity at those equilibria, so that small departures from the
equilibria lead to large changes in the composition of the population. However,
the intermediate equilibrium is locally stable, as the transition function inter-
sects the 45 line at a place where its slope is smaller than unity. Hence as long
as the initial population is heterogeneous (i.e. 0 < q0 < 1), the economy will
converge towards that equilibrium.
Finally, a few words should be added here regarding the dynamics of aggre-
gate life expectancy, equal here to 2+qtH+(1 qt)U . Clearly, if the economy
starts from a situation where the healthy lifestyle is dominated by the unhealthy
lifestyle (i.e. 0 < q0 < 1=2), it follows from Proposition 1 that, over time, the
proportion of healthy agents will go up (since the equilibrium q > 1=2), which
will have the e¤ect of raising the aggregate life expectancy. Thus this model
describes the secular rise of life expectancy as caused by a rise in the proportion
of individuals adhering to a healthy lifestyle (or, equivalently, by a decline of the
proportion of the population having an unhealthy lifestyle). Once the long-run
equilibrium is reached, the life expectancy stabilizes, but still hides signicant
inequalities between the two subgroups.
15Figure 1 relies on the following parameters values:  = 0:6;  = 0:5; '^  ~' = 1:5; H = 0:5
and U = 0:3:
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Regarding the long-run level of aggregate life expectancy, it should also be
noted that, quite paradoxically, an exogenous rise in the survival probability
U thanks, for instance, to an exogenous medical technology shock, will not
necessarily raise the long-run aggregate life expectancy. Indeed, a rise in U
has also the e¤ect to reduce the long-run proportion of healthy agents in the
population, so that a rise in U may reduce - rather than raise - the aggregate
life expectancy.16 Hence a positive exogenous medical shock reducing the dan-
gerousness of some lifestyles can have a negative e¤ect on long-run aggregate
life expectancy, since this modies the whole evolutionary dynamics of lifestyles
in the economy, by favouring the expansion of the unhealthy lifestyle.
4 A model with parental altruism
While the basic model developed in the previous sections has the virtue of
simplicity, and can easily explain the improvement of survival prospects over
time thanks to the spreading of the healthy lifestyle, it relies, however, on some
strong assumptions. In particular, one may think that parents, although they
prefer, ceteris paribus, having a child of their type, may nonetheless be divided
as to what they should do in a context where the lifestyle a¤ects the survival
prospects of their children. Actually, it could be argued that parents are divided
between two desires. On the one hand, the desire to coexist with a child like
themselves, that is, a child with whom they share the same lifestyle. On the
other hand, the desire to a have a child that is as healthy as possible.
For instance, parents who smoke may not want their children to smoke too,
even though such parents would feel quite isolated in their unhealthy lifestyle
if their children did not smoke. The same can be said of alcoholic behaviour:
alcoholic parents do not want their children to be like them. Note, however, that
in many other cases, the balance between the two desires is less obvious. For
instance, the accommodation choice may be a source of tensions between the
two desires: if parents live in a highly polluted urban area, they will probably
want their children to live also in the same area, and not in a distant, unpolluted
rural area far in the countryside, even if this would be better for the health of
their children. Similarly, workaholic parents are likely to prefer to have quite
active children, even though this is not good for their health. Thus in many
cases there may be conicts between the willingness to share something with
children and the willingness to "have the best" for their children.
The basic model only accounted for the rst of those motives, but did not
allow parents to be concerned with the health of their children. In this section,
we extend the model, to allow for the second kind of parental desire. For that
purpose, we will assume that parents derive also some utility from the expected
health of the child. As we shall see, this will a¤ect the dynamics of heterogeneity
in the population.
16Given that q2 = 
H
H+U
, the long-run aggregate life expectancy  is 2 + (
H)2+(U )2
H+U
.
Hence the impact of a marginal rise in U is: @
@U
=
2HU (H)2+(U )2
(H+U )2
. Hence this is
negative if and only if
 
U
2
<
 
H
2   2HU .
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4.1 A modied framework
If parents derive some utility from the health status of their children, indepen-
dently from whether their children are like them or not, the objective function
of a parent of type i 2 fH;Ug can be written as:
U i =  
 
ei
2
2
+ i
h
piit+1'^+ p
ij
t+1~'
i
+ 
 
E(child

) (8)
where  reects health-oriented altruism towards the child (not full altruism,
as there is no care for socialization), while E(child) is the expected health
status of the child.17 The additional term introduced here is not weighted by
the probability of survival of the parent, as we assume that this altruism is not
conditional on coexistence with the child. The parent wants, in any case, his
child to have a good health. Finally, note also that the additional term does not
need to be interpreted in terms of altruism: it could be the case that parents
just care about having healthy children, without any benevolence behind.18
This objective function can be rewritten as
U i =  
 
ei
2
2
+ i
h
piit+1'^+ p
ij
t+1~'
i
+ 

piit+1
i + pijt+1
j

(9)
Assuming an interior solution, the optimal socialization e¤ort is now:
eit =
i(1  qi) ('^  ~') + (1  qi)  i   j

(10)
If  equals 0, we are back to basic model. Otherwise, there is now an ad-
ditional term at the numerator of the RHS.19 For healthy parents, the factor 
i   j is positive, which reinforces the socialization e¤ort in comparison with
self-oriented parents. On the contrary, for unhealthy parents, this additional
term is negative, and thus pushes the socialization e¤ort at a lower level. How-
ever, given the transmission technology it+1 = e
i
t, the socialization e¤ort must
be non-negative. Thus, if the altruistic motive is large, or if the longevity dif-
ferential is strong, the optimal socialization e¤ort chosen by unhealthy parents
is a corner solution, i.e. eUt = 0.
Actually, the socialization e¤orts of healthy and unhealthy parents are given
by
eHt =
H(1  qH) ('^  ~') + (1  qH)  H   U

> 0
eUt =
U (1  qU ) ('^  ~') + (1  qU )  U   H

> 0 if U ('^  ~') >   H   U
= 0 if U ('^  ~')    H   U
In the latter case, the unhealthy parent does not socialize his child, in the
sense that there will be no investment to make him share the parents lifestyle.
17See Ponthiere (2007) on empirical studies estimating intrafamily altruistic weights.
18Nonetheless, the time structure of this model is such that the parental concern for the
childs life expectancy cannot be caused by selsh coexistence concerns, as the survival of
children concerns the old age, at which their parents are necessarily dead.
19Hence, to have eit  1, we can now impose
i('^ ~')+(i j)

 1.
11
To sum up, in this extended model, there are two forces driving parental
socialization e¤orts. On the one hand, parents would like their children to have
the same lifestyle as theirs; on the other hand, parents would like to prevent
their children from early death. It is important to notice that those two forces do
not contradict each other for healthy parents, for whom the promotion of their
own lifestyle H coincides with the promotion of best survival prospects for their
children. However, for unhealthy parents, there is a conict between those two
forces: the former recommends an e¤ort yo transmit the U -type, whereas the
latter does not. Hence, when the latter force exceeds the former one, unhealthy
parents prefer not investing in the socialization of their children at all. That
case happens when parental altruism is su¢ ciently strong, and when the life
expectancy gap between the two lifestyles is su¢ ciently large, that is, when we
have U ('^  ~')    H   U.
4.2 Long-run dynamics
Substituting for Ht+1 = e
H
t and 
U
t+1 = e
U
t in the expression
qt+1 =

Ht+1 +
 
1  Ht+1

qt

qt +
 
1  Ut+1

qt

(1  qt)
yields the following transition functions qt+1  G1(qt) and qt+1  G2(qt):
G1(qt) = qt + qt(1  qt) [
H('^ ~')+(H U)](1 qt) [U ('^ ~')+(U H)]qt

if U ('^  ~') >  (H   U )
G2(qt) = qt + (1  qt)qt [
H('^ ~')+(H U)](1 qt)

if U ('^  ~')   (H   U )
As in the previous section, the existence and uniqueness of a stationary
equilibrium can be discussed by exploring whether the transition function admits
a xed point. For that purpose, we will here distinguish between two cases,
depending on the transition function. Proposition 2 summarizes our results.
Proposition 2 (1) If U ('^  ~') >   H   U, there exist three stationary
equilibria:
q1 = 0 ; q3 = 1
q2 =
H ('^  ~') +   H   U
U ('^  ~') + H ('^  ~') >
1
2
where only q2 is locally stable.
(2) If U ('^  ~')    H   U, there exist two stationary equilibria:
q1 = 0 ; q2 = 1
where only q2 is locally stable.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Thus, if the strength of altruism is limited, and/or if the longevity di¤erential
between healthy and unhealthy agents is small, there still exist three stationary
equilibria, as in the basic model. Among those equilibria, two of them involve
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a homogeneous population, while the intermediate equilibrium, which is the
unique locally stable one, involves a heterogeneous population. Note, however,
that the intermediate equilibrium has here a di¤erent form in comparison with
the basic model. Clearly, it involves a larger proportion of healthy persons than
in the basic model.20 Hence, the introduction of parental altruistic concerns for
childrens health tends to raise the long-run proportion of healthy agents, and,
thus, the long-run aggregate life expectancy.
If altruism is strong enough, and/or if the longevity di¤erential is large, the
intermediate equilibrium does not exist, and the equilibrium with a population
made exclusively of healthy agents is locally stable. The same result holds if
agents strongly discount the future (i.e.  is low) or if the welfare gains from
having a child of ones type are low (i.e. '^   ~' is close to zero). Hence, any
population with at least some agents adhering to a healthy lifestyle will end
up being fully made of agents having a healthy lifestyle and, hence, a high life
expectancy. Figures 2 and 3 below illustrate the two cases.21
q t
Figure 2: The altruistic model: case
(1)
q t
Figure 3: The altruistic model: case
(2)
Thus, the introduction of a parental altruistic motive may a¤ect the long-run
dynamics of lifestyles and longevity. Clearly, if the parental altruism is su¢ -
ciently large and/or the longevity di¤erential induced by lifestyles is su¢ ciently
wide, only the healthy lifestyle must prevail in the long-run: the equilibrium
population is necessarily homogeneous. Hence Proposition 2 suggests that the
survival of unhealthy lifestyles at the equilibrium can only be due to (1) a low
parental altruism (in comparison with the egoistic welfare gains from social-
ization); and (2) the fact that the unhealthy lifestyle does not yield a too big
reduction of life expectancy in comparison with the healthy lifestyle.
Therefore, despite parental altruism, some - relatively benign - unhealthy
lifestyles will survive in the long-run, but not more dangerous lifestyles. Lifestyles
yielding a large mortality di¤erential will mechanically disappear, as parents will
20This is so because a positive constant is added to the numerator of the intermediate
equilibria under the basic model.
21Figure 2 relies on the following parameters values:  = 0:2;  = 0:6;  = 0:5; '^  ~' = 1:5;
H = 0:5 and U = 0:3: Figure 3 relies on the parameters:  = 0:4;  = 0:6;  = 0:5;
'^  ~' = 0:5; H = 0:8 and U = 0:3:
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not invest in the transmission of those lifestyles even if they adopted these when
being younger.22
Finally, regarding the dynamics of the aggregate life expectancy, we can
make here the same observation as above: starting from a population where the
healthy lifestyle is dominated by the unhealthy lifestyle (i.e. 0 < q0 < 1=2), the
economy will, over time, exhibit a rise in the aggregate life expectancy, as the
proportion of healthy agents in the population goes up during the transition to-
wards the long-run equilibrium. Nevertheless, a signicant di¤erence here is that
the long-run aggregate life expectancy is, provided U ('^  ~') >   H   U,
a function not only of group-specic life expectancies H and U , but, also, of
preference parameters such as  (time preferences) and  (parental altruism),
unlike in the basic model. Furthermore, if U ('^  ~')    H   U, the
proportion of healthy persons will tend towards 1, so that the aggregate life
expectancy will be here merely 2 + H .
Regarding the e¤ect of an exogenous rise in U on aggregate life expectancy,
this will, under U ('^  ~') >   H   U, reduce the long-run level of q, and
may thus also, quite paradoxically, reduce long-run aggregate life expectancy, as
in the basic model. On the contrary, as long as U ('^  ~')    H   U, a
rise in U will not a¤ect the long-run level of aggregate life expectancy, equal, in
that case, to 2+H . Indeed, as long as U ('^  ~')    H   U, unhealthy
parents do not invest in the transmission of the unhealthy lifestyle, and so
a change in their life expectancy does not have any e¤ect on the socialization
process. This constitutes another signicant departure from the standard model.
Therefore, the introduction of parental altruistic concerns for childrens health
inuences also the long-run dynamics of aggregate life expectancy.
5 A model with asymmetric socialization costs
The present analysis, by highlighting the evolutionary advantage of healthy
lifestyles, tends to provide a quite optimistic message. Actually, the basic
model developed in Sections 2 and 3 emphasized that, thanks to the larger
life expectancy associated with a healthy lifestyle, healthy parents must, ceteris
paribus, invest more in the socialization of their children, so that the healthy
lifestyle must be majoritary in the long-run. Moreover, the introduction of
parental altruism (Section 4) tends to reinforce that optimistic message.
However, it should be stressed that our analysis relied so far on some sig-
nicant simplications, which may be far from neutral for the issue at stake.
In particular, we assumed, throughout our study, that the costs of socialization
for parents are equal whatever the lifestyle that they want to promote. More
precisely, the welfare cost from socialization e¤orts are equal for parents who
want to transmit a healthy lifestyle and for parents who want to transmit an
unhealthy lifestyle. That assumption is quite strong, as it may be more di¢ -
cult to transmit a healthy lifestyle rather than an unhealthy lifestyle. Take, for
instance, the case of eating habits. It is probably more di¢ cult for a parent
to transmit to his children the lifestyle "non-snacking between meals", rather
than to transmit the lifestyle "snacking between meals". Thus assuming equal
socialization costs across types seems to simplify the picture signicantly.
22 In some sense, for those lifetyles, the altruistic concern will overcome the will to have
children like oneself.
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5.1 Unequal socialization costs
To explore the robustness of our conclusions to that aspect of the socialization
process, let us now develop another extension of our model, where the cost of
socialization varies across the parents, depending on whether the lifestyle to be
transmitted is healthy or unhealthy.
Introducing asymmetric socialization costs in our model can be made by
assuming that the disutility of socialization varies across parents, depending on
the lifestyle to which they adhere. Thus we have now
C(eit) = 
i
 
eit
2
2
(11)
where i, which accounts for the disutility of socialization e¤orts (i > 0), is
now type-specic. In the example developed above (eating habits), it is likely
that H > U , since the healthy lifestyle is more di¢ cult to transmit than the
unhealthy lifestyle. Note, however, that this may not be the case. One could
imagine some healthy lifestyles that are easier to transmit. For instance, the
(unhealthy) lifestyle "workaholic" may be more di¢ cult to transmit than the
(healthy) lifestyle "non-workaholic", leading to H < U . We will thus, for the
sake of generality, not restrict ourselves to a particular assumption.
The objective function for a parent of type i 2 fH;Ug is now
U i =  i
 
ei
2
2
+ i
h
piit+1'^+ p
ij
t+1~'
i
+ 

piit+1
i + pijt+1
j

(12)
Assuming an interior solution, the optimal socialization e¤ort for a parent
of type i 2 fH;Ug is now:23
eit =
i(1  qi) ('^  ~') + (1  qi)  i   j
i
(13)
As above, the transmission technology it+1 = e
i
t presupposes that the so-
cialization e¤ort must be non-negative. Hence we have
eHt =
H(1  qH) ('^  ~') + (1  qH)  H   U
H
> 0
eUt =
U (1  qU ) ('^  ~') + (1  qU )  U   H
U
> 0 if U ('^  ~') >   H   U
= 0 if U ('^  ~')    H   U
When the welfare costs from socialization are equal across parents with dis-
tinct lifestyles (i.e. H = U = ), whether healthy parents invest more or less
in the socialization of their children than unhealthy parents depends on the life
expectancy gap between the two lifestyles (i.e. H versus U ), on the relative
proportions of the two lifestyles in the population (i.e. qH versus qU ), and on
degree of altruism , but is invariant to the level of , as this plays symmetrically
for the two types of parents. However, once H 6= U , there is an additional
factor explaining di¤erences in socialization e¤orts. If the healthy lifestyle is
23To have eit  1, we now impose
i('^ ~')+(i j)
i
 1.
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more di¢ cult to transmit than the unhealthy one (i.e. H > U ), this pushes
the socialization e¤ort of the healthy parent downwards. On the contrary, if
the healthy lifestyle is less di¢ cult to transmit (i.e. H < U ), this pushes the
socialization e¤ort of the healthy parent upwards.
5.2 Long-run dynamics
Substituting for Ht+1 = e
H
t and 
U
t+1 = e
U
t in the expression
qt+1 =

Ht+1 +
 
1  Ht+1

qt

qt +
 
1  Ut+1

qt

(1  qt)
yields the following transition functions qt+1  G1(qt) and qt+1  G2(qt):
G1(qt) = qt + (1  qt)qt

[H('^ ~')+(H U)](1 qt)
H
  [
U ('^ ~')+(U H)]qt
U

if U ('^  ~') >  (H   U )
G2(qt) = qt + (1  qt)qt [
H('^ ~')+(H U)](1 qt)
H
if U ('^  ~')   (H   U )
As in the previous sections, the existence and uniqueness of a stationary
equilibrium can be studied by exploring whether the transition function admits
a xed point. Proposition 3 summarizes our results.
Proposition 3 (1) If U ('^  ~') >   H   U, there exist three stationary
equilibria:
q1 = 0 ; q3 = 1
q2 =
H('^ ~')+(H U)
H
H('^ ~')+(H U )
H
+ 
U ('^ ~')+(U H)
U
where only q2 is locally stable.
(2) If U ('^  ~')    H   U, there exist two stationary equilibria:
q1 = 0 ; q2 = 1
where only q2 is locally stable.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In comparison with Proposition 2, Proposition 3 di¤ers regarding the level of
the intermediate long-run equilibrium q2, which, here again, is the unique locally
stable equilibrium when U ('^  ~') >   H   U. It is straightforward to
see that, provided the welfare costs from socialization were equal, i.e. H =
U = , then the expression for the intermediate equilibrium q2 would collapse
to
q2 =
H ('^  ~') +   H   U
H ('^  ~') + U ('^  ~')
which is independent from the socialization cost parameter . As discussed
above, we know that, under equal socialization costs, the healthy lifestyle has
an evolutionary advantage: q2 > 1=2. However, this is no longer necessarily the
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case under unequal socialization costs, as the healthy lifestyle may be dominated
in the long-run:
q2 <
1
2
() 
H ('^  ~') +   H   U
U ('^  ~') +  (U   H) <
H
U
Under equal socialization costs, the RHS equals 1, and the LHS is necessarily
larger than 1 (given H > U ), so that the condition is never satised. However,
if the healthy lifestyle is much more costly to transmit than the unhealthy
lifestyle, i.e. H >> U , than the above condition may be satised, provided
the life expectancy gap between the two lifestyles is not too large, and provided
parental altruism is not too strong.
In sum, this section shows that, despite the lifetime horizon e¤ect and the
presence of parental altruism, which both favour the transmission of the healthy
lifestyle, the mere introduction of asymmetric socialization costs su¢ ces to qual-
ify the optimistic result according to which healthy lifestyles must dominate
unhealthy lifestyles in the long-run. How costly the socialization is to parents
is a key ingredient for understanding the long-run dynamics of healthy and
unhealthy habits and lifestyles, and, from that, the dynamics of life expectancy.
6 Concluding remarks
The starting point of this paper was the large empirical literature on the inter-
generational transmission of health and survival outcomes, and on the signicant
impact of lifestyles on these. While those studies suggest that the transmission
of lifestyles across generations may be a signicant phenomenon, these tell us
little on the equilibrium prevalence of (un)healthy lifestyles in the long-run.
To answer that question, we set up a three-period OLG model with a social-
ization process following Bisin and Verdier (2001), and where the socialization
concerns the adherence to a healthy or an unhealthy lifestyle, which yield dis-
tinct life expectancies. We show that, if parents are only motivated by the desire
to share their lifestyle with their children, there exist three long-run equilibria
in that economy, each of these coincides with a constant partition of the popu-
lation in the di¤erent lifestyles: two homogeneous equilibrium populations, and
one heterogeneous one, which involves a majority of agents with the healthy
lifestyle. This evolutionary advantage of the healthy lifestyle comes from the
fact that the longer time horizon associated to it leads to a higher socialization
e¤ort of the healthy parents ceteris paribus in comparison with the socialization
e¤ort of the unhealthy parents. Note, however, that, given that the intermediate
equilibrium is the only one that is locally stable, unhealthy lifestyles are, under
such a framework, likely to survive, at least to some extent, in the long-run,
despite their negative e¤ects on life expectancy.
Then, we proposed another framework, where parents care not only about
sharing their lifestyle with their children, but care also altruistically about the
health of their children.24 We show that, if parents are strongly altruistic,
and if the longevity gap induced by lifestyles is su¢ ciently large, only healthy
24The postulated form of concern for the childs health can be, in principle, regarded as
egoistic. However, given that it cannot be driven by coexistence (as parents are dead at the
old age, whatever their children are long-lived or not), it is more plausible to regard that
concern as altruistic.
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lifestyles can survive in the long-run, as strongly altruistic parents do not invest
in the transmission of a lifestyle that causes much damage to the health of their
children. Otherwise, if the unhealthy lifestyle is not too damageable, there still
exists an equilibrium with a heterogeneous population dominated by the healthy
lifestyle. It follows from this that, under parental altruism, only some - but not
all - unhealthy lifestyles will survive in the long-run.
Finally, we developed an expanded version of the model inclusive of asym-
metric socialization costs, varying across the lifestyles to be transmitted by
parents. The intuition underlying that theoretical generalization is that healthy
lifestyles may be more di¢ cult to transmit by parents than unhealthy lifestyles.
The introduction of unequal socialization costs a¤ects our results signicantly,
since the healthy lifestyle may not exhibit an evolutionary advantage. The
healthy lifestyle may be dominated in the long-run, provided it is much more
costly to transmit than the unhealthy lifestyle, if the life expectancy gap between
the two lifestyles and the parental altruistic concerns are small.
In the light of those ndings, one can try to extrapolate the future of some
unhealthy lifestyles: what about the future of smoking, alcoholism, and un-
healthy eating habits? The answer was shown to depend on (1) the mortality
gap induced by those practices; (2) the degree of altruism of parents (in com-
parison with the welfare gains from coexisting with a child like them); (3) the
socialization costs associated with the healthy and unhealthy lifestyles. De-
pending on those factors, unhealthy lifestyles will survive to a more or less large
extent. Given the di¢ culties to estimate preference parameters in general (in-
cluding altruistic concerns and disutility from socialization e¤orts), no answer
can be given for the long-run prevalence of a particular lifestyle. Nevertheless,
some qualitative predictions can be made on the basis of observed mortality
di¤erentials induced by lifestyles. According to the estimates in Kaplan et al.
(1987), smoking, which leads to a larger mortality gap than alcoholism or over-
weight, is likely to survive to a smaller extent than those two other unhealthy
lifestyles in the long-run (everything else being constant).
Note, however, that the present study, which focused on the dynamics of
(un)healthy lifestyles transmission through a vertical or oblique (decentralized)
socialization process, ignored a major agent: the State. Given that governments
may a¤ect the transmission of lifestyles through various channels (e.g. informa-
tion campaigns, education programs), the absence of a government is a major
simplication in our model.25 Hence it makes sense to add a few words here on
the impact of governments on the dynamics of lifestyles transmission, and, in a
second stage, to try to draw policy conclusions.
Regarding the former point, it should be stressed that governments can
have a large inuence on the dynamics of lifestyles transmission. However, it
is hard, in the light of the model, to draw a precise conclusion on the sign of
that inuence, since various e¤ects play in opposite directions. A government
could, by information campaigns, support the parentss attempts to transmit
a healthy lifestyle, which would, by reducing H , raise the long-run prevalence
of the healthy lifestyle.26 But, at the same time, government-funded medical
25On the e¤ectiveness of public health programs (and its measurement of spillovers arising
from these), see Chaudhuri (2009).
26 Indeed, teachers could, by supporting the healthy parents arguments, make the trans-
mission of the healthy lifestyle easier. Note, however, that this e¤ect is far from certain, as
teaching programs may, if inadequate, be counterproductive, especially with teenagers.
18
research against diseases related to unhealthy lifestyles raises U , which reduces
the long-run prevalence of the healthy lifestyle ceteris paribus. Hence it is not
obvious to draw clear conclusions on the actual role of governments.
Moreover, it is even more di¢ cult to characterize the optimal public policy,
since this would depend on another aspect of the problem, which was not treated
here: the temporal welfare levels associated with the di¤erent lifestyles. Clearly,
unhealthy lifestyles are also a source of gains in terms of temporal welfare (see,
for instance, sin goods consumptions, such as alcohol, tobacco, etc.). That
aspect should also be taken into account when discussing the optimal public
policy. Thus one should be cautious before drawing normative conclusions from
the present positive dynamic analysis.27
To conclude, it should also be reminded that the present theoretical frame-
work, despite its generality, may not fully capture all aspects of socialization.
Our model relies on a particular lifestyles transmission technology, whereas
other, more general, candidate technologies should also be examined. More-
over, socialization is here vertical or oblique, but not horizontal (i.e. intraco-
hort). This constitutes another limitation of the paper, as some lifestyles and
behaviours may be transmitted within cohorts rather than between cohorts.
Furthermore, the role of the family in the socialization process is here limited to
the choice of a socialization e¤ort, which is also a simplication, as other family
choices matter (education, fertility, food, etc.).28 Finally, this model considers
decentralized socialization through parents or role models, but does not study
the role of centralized education or information programs, which may also in-
uence lifestyles dynamics. Those non-trivial generalizations are left for future
research.
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8 Appendix
Basic model: existence and uniqueness The transition function is
such that G(0) = 0 and G(1) = 1. Hence, G(qt) meets the 45 line at the two
extremities, which are stationary equilibria. Note also that the derivative of
G(qt) with respect to qt is
G0(qt) = 1 +
 ('^  ~')


H(1  qt)2   Hqt2(1  qt)  U2qt(1  qt) + Uq2t

We have
G0(0) = 1 +
 ('^  ~')

H > 1
G0(1) = 1 +
 ('^  ~')

U > 1
Thus, given that the slope of G(qt) is higher than 1 at qt equal to 0 and 1, it
must be the case that G(qt) is above the 45 line in the neighbourhood of 0, and
below the 45 line in the neighbourhood of 1. Hence, by continuity, G(qt) must
intersect the 45 line somewhere, for a level of qt between 0 and 1. Regarding
the uniqueness of that intermediate equilibrium, substituting for qt+1 = qt = q
in the transition function shows that this intermediate equilibrium takes a single
value: q = 
H
H+U
> 12 .
Basic model: stability Stability requires
 @G@qt  < 1. We have
G0(0) = 1 +
 ('^  ~')

H > 1
G0(1) = 1 +
 ('^  ~')

U > 1
Thus q = 0 and q = 1 are not stable.
Finally, at qt = 
H
H+U
, we have:
G0(qt) = 1   ('^  ~')

HU
H + U
< 1
Given 
H('^ ~')
 < 1, that expression is smaller than 1 in absolute value, so that
the equilibrium is locally stable.
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Altruistic model: existence and uniqueness Note that G1(qt) is such
that: G1(0) = 0 and G1(1) = 1. Hence, G1(qt) meets the 45 line at the
two extremities, which are stationary equilibria. The derivative of G1 (qt) with
respect to qt is
G01(qt) = 1 + [1  2qt]

H ('^  ~') +   H   U (1  qt)  U ('^  ~') +   U   H qt

+qt(1  qt)
  H ('^  ~') +   H   U  U ('^  ~') +   U   H

We have
G01(0) = 1 +
H ('^  ~') +   H   U

> 1
G01(1) = 1 +
U ('^  ~') +   U   H

> 1
Thus, under U ('^  ~') >   H   U, the transition function lies above the
45 line in the neighbourhood of 0, and below the 45 line in the neighbourhood
of 1. Hence, the existence of an intermediate equilibrium can be proved as in
the basic model. Fixing qt+1 = qt = q in the transition function yields the
intermediate equilibrium:
q =
H ('^  ~') +   H   U
U ('^  ~') + H ('^  ~') >
1
2
In the case where U ('^  ~')    H   U, the transition functionG2(qt)
is such that G2(0) = 0 and G2(1) = 1. Hence, G2(qt) meets the 45 line at the
two extremities, which are stationary equilibria. Note also that
G02(qt) = 1 +
 2(1  qt)qt + (1  qt)2 H ('^  ~') +   H   U

We have
G02(0) = 1 +
H ('^  ~') +   H   U

> 1
G02(1) = 1
Thus, under U ('^  ~')    H   U, the transition function lies above the
45 line in the neighbourhood of 0, but does not lie below the 45 line in the
neighbourhood of 1. Actually, it is not di¢ cult to show that there cannot be
an intermediate equilibrium in this model. Indeed xing qt+1 = qt = q in the
transition function yields:
q = q + (1  q)2q

H ('^  ~') +   H   U

which cannot be true for 0 < q < 1. Thus there exists no intermediate equilib-
rium under U ('^  ~')    H   U.
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Altruistic model: stability In the case where U ('^  ~') >   H   U,
stability requires
@G1@qt  < 1. We have
G01(qt) = 1 + [1  2qt]

H ('^  ~') +   H   U (1  qt)  U ('^  ~') +   U   H qt

+qt(1  qt)
  H ('^  ~') +   H   U  U ('^  ~') +   U   H

Hence
G01(0) = 1 +
H ('^  ~') +   H   U

> 1
G01(1) = 1 +
U ('^  ~') +   U   H

> 1
Thus, given U ('^  ~') >   H   U, neither q = 0 nor q = 1 are stable.
Finally, at qt =
H('^ ~')+(H U)
U ('^ ~')+H('^ ~') , we have:
G01(qt) = 1 

H ('^  ~') +   H   U U ('^  ~') +   U   H
 [U ('^  ~') + H ('^  ~')] < 1
Hence, given that socialization e¤orts are between 0 and 1, the intermediate
equilibrium must be locally stable.
When U ('^  ~')    H   U, stability requires @G2@qt  < 1. We have
G02(qt) = 1 +
 2(1  qt)qt + (1  qt)2 H ('^  ~') +   H   U

Hence
G02(0) = 1 +

H ('^  ~') +   H   U

> 1
G02(1) = 1
so that q = 0 is not stable. Regarding q = 1, the equality G02(1) = 1 does not
exactly coincide with what insures local stability (a strict inequality). However,
it is clear that the transition function crosses the 45 line from above at 1, and
thus that equilibrium can be regarded as locally stable.
Asymmetric costs: existence and uniqueness Note rst that the
transition function G1(qt) is such that: G1(0) = 0 and G1(1) = 1. Hence,
G1 (qt) meets the 45 line at the two extremities, which are stationary equilib-
ria. Note also that:
G01(qt) = 1 + (1  2qt)
"
H ('^  ~') +   H   U (1  qt)
H
 

U ('^  ~') +   U   H qt
U
#
+(1  qt)qt
"
 

H ('^  ~') +   H   U
H
 

U ('^  ~') +   U   H
U
#
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We have
G01(0) = 1 +
H ('^  ~') +   H   U
H
> 1
G01(1) = 1 +
U ('^  ~') +   U   H
U
> 1
Thus, under U ('^  ~') >   H   U, the transition function lies above the
45 line in the neighbourhood of 0, and below the 45 line in the neighbourhood
of 1. Hence, the existence of an intermediate equilibrium can be proved as in
the basic model. Fixing qt+1 = qt = q in qt+1 = G(qt) allows us to derive the
intermediate equilibrium:
q =
H('^ ~')+(H U)
H
H('^ ~')+(H U )
H
+ 
U ('^ ~')+(U H)
U
When U ('^  ~')    H   U, G2(qt) is such that: G2(0) = 0 and
G2(1) = 1. Hence, G2(qt) meets the 45 line at the two extremities, which are
stationary equilibria. Note also that
G02(qt) = 1 +
 2(1  qt)qt + (1  qt)2 H ('^  ~') +   H   U
H
We have
G02(0) = 1 +
H ('^  ~') +   H   U

> 1
G02(1) = 1
Thus, under U ('^  ~')    H   U, the transition function lies above the
45 line in the neighbourhood of 0, but does not lie below the 45 line in the
neighbourhood of 1. Actually, it is not di¢ cult to show that there cannot be
an intermediate equilibrium in this model. Indeed xing qt+1 = qt = q in the
transition function yields:
q = q + (1  q)2q

H ('^  ~') +   H   U
H
which cannot be true for 0 < q < 1. Thus there exists no intermediate equilib-
rium under U ('^  ~')    H   U.
Asymmetric costs: stability If U ('^  ~') >   H   U, stability
requires
@G1@qt  < 1. We have
G01(qt) = 1 + (1  2qt)
"
H ('^  ~') +   H   U (1  qt)
H
 

U ('^  ~') +   U   H qt
U
#
+(1  qt)qt
"
 

H ('^  ~') +   H   U
H
 

U ('^  ~') +   U   H
U
#
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We have
G01(0) = 1 +
H ('^  ~') +   H   U
H
> 1
G01(1) = 1 +
U ('^  ~') +   U   H
U
> 1
Thus, given U ('^  ~') >   H   U, q = 0 and q = 1 are not stable.
Finally, at qt = q2, we have: G01(qt) < 1, so that, given that individual
socialization e¤orts are between 0 and 1, the intermediate equilibrium, if it
exists, must be locally stable.
If U ('^  ~')    H   U, stability requires @G2@qt  < 1. We have
G02(qt) = 1 +
 2(1  qt)qt + (1  qt)2 H ('^  ~') +   H   U

Hence
G02(0) = 1 +
H ('^  ~') +   H   U

> 1
G02(1) = 1
so that q = 0 is not stable. Regarding q = 1, the equality G02(1) = 1 does not
exactly coincide with what insures local stability (a strict inequality). However,
it is clear that the transition function crosses the 45 line from above at 1, and,
thus that equilibrium can be regarded as locally stable.
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